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  2263 
REPAVING ROUTE 128: HOW NEW 
LEGISLATION IN MASSACHUSETTS 
IMPACTS THE NONCOMPETE DEBATE 
Abstract: On October 1, 2018, new law governing the use of employee noncom-
petition agreements went into effect in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The 
updated rules, a compromise between those seeking to increase worker mobility 
and those intent on preserving certain intellectual property protections, were the 
culmination of many years of legislative debate. Before the passage of the new 
measures, Massachusetts exemplified the type of state that tended to honor em-
ployee covenants not to compete. One scholar famously identified Massachu-
setts’s high enforcement of noncompetes as the primary cause of the Route 128 
business district’s relative downfall compared to Silicon Valley, where noncom-
petition agreements are generally void. Time will tell whether the new noncom-
pete legal regime will help the Route 128 region catch up to Silicon Valley’s ex-
plosive growth; in the interim, as the national dispute over the merits of noncom-
petition agreements rages on, other states will surely look to Massachusetts be-
fore choosing whether—and how—to rewrite their employee noncompete laws. 
This Note examines the recent Massachusetts legislation in the context of the re-
gion’s history and the broader national discussion on noncompete laws, arguing 
that the new rules in Massachusetts set a useful example while leaving several is-
sues—particularly surrounding the garden leave provision and government en-
forcement—unresolved. 
INTRODUCTION 
At the end of their session in the summer of 2018, Massachusetts law-
makers passed legislation designed to limit the use of noncompetition agree-
ments, also known as noncompete agreements or noncompetes, in the Com-
monwealth.1 For proponents of the new rules, these modifications to the em-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Jon Chesto, Wide-Ranging Bill Is Meant to Spur Economic Development, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 1, 
2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2018/08/01/lawmakers-authorize-millions-grants-credits-
along-with-policy-changes-economic-bill/ZERfKuVDdwVSejwfrnCwFL/story.html [https://perma.
cc/JRL8-6RXF]. The changes to noncompetition agreements were passed in the early morning hours, 
just before the legislature concluded its sessions for the year. Id. They were included as part of a broad 
$1.2 billion economic development bill. Id. The noncompete provisions went into effect on October 1, 
2018 and apply to agreements entered on or after that date. Katie Lannan, Noncompete-Agreement 
Laws Alterations Take Effect Monday, LOWELL SUN (Sept. 27, 2018), http://www.lowellsun.com/
business/ci_32166487/noncompete-agreement-laws-alterations-take-effect-Monday [https://perma.
cc/Q8C9-4SGB]. Noncompetition agreements are also referred to by other names, including cove-
nants not to compete, restrictive covenants, or noncompete covenants. Covenant, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (11th ed. 2019). This Note uses “noncompetition agreement,” “covenant not to compete,” 
and “noncompete” interchangeably. 
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ployer-employee relationship were welcome changes.2 Debate over the poten-
tial harms of noncompetition agreements in Massachusetts had persisted for 
nearly a decade, and several prior legislative sessions ended with failed at-
tempts at similar reform.3 
Massachusetts receives particular scrutiny for its approach to these 
agreements.4 Scholars argue that the regions’ opposite legal approaches to em-
ployee mobility explains the divergent economic outcomes in Massachusetts’s 
Route 128 business district and California’s Silicon Valley.5 In Silicon Valley, 
where there was a long state history of refusing to enforce noncompetition 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See, e.g., Barb Darrow, This High-Tech State May Make It Harder to Use Non-Compete Claus-
es, FORTUNE (June 30, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/30/massachusetts-non-compete-passes 
[https://perma.cc/7GEV-C9FY] (characterizing noncompete agreements as posing a pressing problem in 
Massachusetts); Marc C. McGovern, We’re Writing a New Law on Noncompetes—Let’s Get It Right, 
BOS. GLOBE (July 12, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/07/11/mass-legislature-
needs-refocus-bill-noncompetes/OGXaYqFHKpFRD6YYXoyPNN/story.html [https://perma.cc/7ZQ3-
2JM3] (advocating for the elimination of noncompetition agreements). 
 3 See Curt Nickisch, Noncompete Reform Dropped as Mass. Lawmakers Reach Economic Develop-
ment Deal, WBUR (July 31, 2014), https://www.wbur.org/news/2014/07/31/economic-development-
noncompete-agreements [https://perma.cc/FEM8-2WDR] (identifying a 2014 proposal for noncompe-
tition law reform that was ultimately abandoned before a final economic development bill passed); 
Curt Woodward, Noncompete Changes Founder at Legislature’s Frantic End, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 1, 
2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/07/31/noncompete-changes-founder-legislature-
frantic-end/W0rbVNv2Cqe0dCScOVD5SI/story.html [https://perma.cc/6QCG-2ZHM] (characteriz-
ing noncompetes as one of the state’s most heated issues after the failure of proposed legislation in 
2016). Initial attempts at similar reform date back to 2008, when state representatives Lori Ehrlich and 
William Brownsberger introduced separate bills seeking to change noncompete laws. Elisabetta Ottoz 
& Franco Cugno, Choosing the Scope of Trade Secret Law When Secrets Complement Patents, 31 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 219, 221 (2011); Kris Olson, Marblehead State Rep Eyes Non-Compete 
Agreements, WICKED LOCAL (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.wickedlocal.com/x1761814088/Marblehead-
state-rep-eyes-non-compete-agreements [https://perma.cc/47LY-EP45]. 
 4 See, e.g., Norman D. Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave Your Employer: Relative Enforcement of 
Covenants Not to Compete, Trends, and Implications for Employee Mobility Policy, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. 
L. 751, 760 n.27 (2011) (identifying Massachusetts as the most notable state reconsidering its non-
compete laws); see also Mark J. Garmaise, Ties That Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Execu-
tive Compensation, and Firm Investment, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 376, 395 (2011) (naming Massachu-
setts specifically as a state in which noncompetition agreements have been enforced at a high rate). 
 5 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: 
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 578 (1999) (pre-
senting this claim at the height of the dotcom era); see also ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE 
FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 68 (2013) (identifying 
Professor Ronald Gilson as the first to suggest that Silicon Valley’s economic success was partially 
attributable to its refusal to enforce noncompetes). Gilson, a joint professor at Stanford and Columbia 
universities, found the comparison between the two regions to be particularly telling because both had 
considerable amounts of businesses in the technology sector but notably different frameworks of em-
ployment law. Gilson, supra, at 577–78. The analysis drew from Professor AnnaLee Saxenian’s work 
comparing the two regions, which was the first to use Silicon Valley’s growth and Route 128’s de-
cline as examples for a case study of what allows some businesses to succeed and what causes others 
to fail. Id. at 578; see ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN 
SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, at 2 (1994). For a detailed discussion, see infra notes 77–99 and 
accompanying text. 
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agreements, economic development flourished.6 From 1986 to 1990, for ex-
ample, the market value of Silicon Valley’s large technology firms grew by 
twenty-five billion dollars.7 Conversely, in the Route 128 area, where the Mas-
sachusetts legal apparatus enforced noncompetition agreements, economic de-
velopment withered.8 In that same timeframe, similarly defined companies in 
the Route 128 region grew by only one billion dollars.9 Those supporting the 
new legislation in Massachusetts sought to limit or eliminate the use of non-
competition agreements, thereby more closely aligning the state’s noncompete 
legal regime with that of California.10 
The new legislation in Massachusetts represents one data point in what 
has become a vastly fragmented national landscape.11 Noncompetition laws 
vary dramatically from state to state, with some states considering the agree-
ments void, some aggressively enforcing them, and others occupying a middle 
ground.12 The policy considerations surrounding this debate span a wide range 
of issues, including broad socioeconomic matters, questions regarding the def-
                                                                                                                           
 6 Gilson, supra note 5, at 586–87. From 1965 through 1995, Silicon Valley rapidly outpaced 
Route 128 in technology employment growth and regional exporting. Id. at 587. Noncompetition 
agreements are generally void under California statute. See, e.g., Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 
189 P.3d 285, 290 (Cal. 2008) (noting that section 16600 of the California Civil Code bars covenants 
not to compete, subject to certain exceptions). 
 7 SAXENIAN, supra note 5, at 2. This analysis focused on the one hundred largest technology 
companies in the United States launched after 1965. Id. Approximately one-third of those one hundred 
firms were based in Silicon Valley. Id. 
 8 Gilson, supra note 5, at 575; see, e.g., Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components, 
Inc., 968 F.2d 1463, 1468–69 (1st Cir. 1992) (construing Massachusetts law as permissive of reasona-
ble noncompetes); Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. Shevrin, 175 N.E.2d 374, 375–76 (Mass. 1961) (“It 
has been long settled in this Commonwealth that a covenant inserted in a contract for personal service 
restricting trade or competition or freedom of employment is not invalid and may be enforced in equi-
ty provided it is necessary for the protection of the employer, is reasonably limited in time and space, 
and is consonant with the public interest.”). 
 9 SAXENIAN, supra note 5, at 2. 
 10 See Jon Chesto, Noncompete Contracts in Massachusetts? Lawmakers Are Near a Deal, BOS. 
GLOBE (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2018/01/15/compromise-may-near-
restricting-noncompetes-mass/GWjyz1NOpnZbGA3YXCbWxL/story.html [https://perma.cc/5YPG-
P3ZX] (citing opinions of supporters of new legislation who identify the legal framework in Califor-
nia as a model). 
 11 See On Amir & Orly Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth Theory of Noncompete Law, 16 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 833, 841 (2013) (discussing the considerable variance in state treatment of non-
compete agreements); Matt Marx et al., Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete Experiment, 
55 MGMT. SCI. 875, 876 (2009) (noting that there are dramatic differences in the enforcement of non-
competes among states); Daniel P. O’Gorman, Contract Theory and Some Realism About Employee 
Covenant Not to Compete Cases, 65 SMU L. REV. 145, 148 (2012) (discussing the unpredictability 
from state to state as to whether the courts will enforce noncompetes). 
 12 Bishara, supra note 4, at 780. Most states take a moderate approach to enforcing noncompeti-
tion agreements, though there are some states at either end of the spectrum. Id. 
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inition and ownership of property, due process concerns, and issues of work-
ers’ rights.13 
This Note examines the new Massachusetts law in the context of the dec-
ades-old comparison of Route 128 and Silicon Valley.14 Part I explains the me-
chanics, philosophical motivations, and history of noncompetition agreements 
while also providing an overview of the historical contrast between Route 128 
and Silicon Valley.15 Part II explains the new Massachusetts legislation in de-
tail.16 Part III discusses the various perspectives on the modern noncompete 
landscape and initial reactions to the Massachusetts law.17 Part IV argues that 
although the new Massachusetts rules represent a vast improvement, bringing 
Route 128’s legal landscape closer to that of Silicon Valley, several issues re-
main problematically unresolved.18 It further suggests that other states current-
ly entrenched in the same debate might learn from Massachusetts by looking at 
both the ambition of the new legislation and its shortcomings.19 
I. YOU CAN’T GET THERE FROM HERE: THE MECHANICS  
AND HISTORY OF NONCOMPETE LAWS 
Noncompetition agreements have a profound impact on American socie-
ty.20 For employers, they serve as an effective and seemingly necessary method 
for protecting trade secrets and client relationships.21 For employees, they can 
act as barriers to departure, sources of intimidation, and salary depressants.22 A 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-
Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 409–14 (analyz-
ing noncompetition agreements in connection with workers’ rights); Sampsa Samila & Olav Sorenson, 
Noncompete Covenants: Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth, 57 MGMT. SCI. 425, 425 
(2011) (examining the effects of noncompete enforcement on labor market growth and entrepreneurial 
activities). See generally Evan Starr, Are Noncompetes Holding Down Wages?, Conference Brief at 
Harvard Law School: Unrigging the Labor Market (June 13, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3223659 [https://perma.cc/Z2T7-HSYK] (analyzing the connection between 
enforcement of noncompete agreements and wages). 
 14 See infra notes 20–238 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 20–99 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 100–123 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 124–185 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 186–215 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 216–238 and accompanying text. 
 20 See Amir & Lobel, supra note 11, at 836 (explaining the constraints faced by employees under 
noncompetes); Garmaise, supra note 4, at 376–77 (linking noncompetes to executive salaries and firm 
capital expenditures); Samila & Sorenson, supra note 13, at 425 (discussing the ubiquity of noncom-
petition agreements). 
 21 Samila & Sorenson, supra note 13, at 425. Without noncompetes, efforts to train employees 
and develop client relationships can leave firms vulnerable to theft of their intellectual capital by de-
parting workers. Id. Limiting an employee’s ability to leave for a competitor allows a company to 
protect these resources. Id. 
 22 Starr, supra note 13, at 5–6 (putting forth empirical evidence to explore the correlation between 
noncompete enforcement and decreased employee salaries and mobility). If an employee is bound by 
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comprehensive study using data from 2014 found that approximately eighteen 
percent of U.S. labor force participants are bound by noncompetes.23 The sig-
nificant presence of noncompetes helps to explain why the laws that govern 
these agreements are currently drawing increasing attention from legislators, 
employers, and workers.24 Several recent and widely publicized disputes in-
volving noncompetes have increased general awareness and fervor surround-
ing the debate.25 
                                                                                                                           
a noncompete, he or she may be reluctant to explore other job opportunities; in this way, the employee 
may struggle to advance in the industry because he or she cannot take advantage of competition in the 
labor market. Id. at 3. An employee who is not compensated for signing a noncompete and misses out 
on the salary benefits of a competitive labor market bears the costs of a noncompete without reaping 
the benefits. Id. 
 23 J.J. Prescott et al., Understanding Noncompetition Agreements: The 2014 Noncompete Survey 
Project, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 369, 461. The survey included 11,505 participants and sought to 
establish an empirical understanding of the frequency and enforcement of noncompetition agreements. 
Id. at 372, 422 n.11. Notably, California has an estimated noncompete incidence of approximately 
19% despite the fact that the state does not enforce such agreements. Id. at 461. Two other recent 
surveys estimated the total proportion of workers bound by noncompetition agreements at 15.5% and 
18%, respectively. Starr, supra note 13, at 5 n.9. 
 24 Bishara, supra note 4, at 753. Recent studies have indicated a rise in both the usage of non-
competes and their enforcement, with an estimated 37% of workers subject to a noncompete at some 
point in their careers. THE WHITE HOUSE, NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS OF THE USAGE, 
POTENTIAL ISSUES, AND STATE RESPONSES 3 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
default/files/non-competes_report_final2.pdf [https://perma.cc/FFQ9-D7FC]. 
 25 Prescott et al., supra note 23, at 372 n.6. Perhaps the most notable example involved sandwich 
chain Jimmy John’s, whose aggressive use of noncompetes received considerable media coverage. 
See, e.g., Samantha Bomkamp, Illinois AG Sues Jimmy John’s Over Noncompete Pacts; Chain ‘Dis-
appointed,’ CHI. TRIB. (June 9, 2016), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-jimmy-johns-
illinois-lawsuit-0609-biz-20160608-story.html [http://perma.cc/LMY4-544S] (detailing one state’s 
lawsuit against Jimmy John’s for its use of noncompetes). Employment contracts at Jimmy John’s 
restricted employees from working in any business that earned more than 10% of its revenue from 
“selling submarine, hero-type, deli-style, pita and/or wrapped or rolled sandwiches” and was within 
three miles of any Jimmy John’s location. Dave Jamieson, Jimmy John’s Makes Low-Wage Workers 
Sign ‘Oppressive’ Noncompete Agreements, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 13, 2014), https://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/13/jimmy-johns-non-compete_n_5978180.html [https://perma.cc/M4K3-
KAJB]. The story drew outrage because it highlighted the perceived unfairness of restricting low-
wage workers by noncompetition agreements. See Sarah Whitten, Jimmy John’s Drops Noncompete 
Clauses Following Settlement, CNBC (June 22, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/06/22/jimmy-
johns-drops-non-compete-clauses-following-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/GK6K-DV8N] (dis-
cussing the New York Attorney General’s motivations for opposing the enforcement of Jimmy John’s 
noncompetition agreements). Similar stories have focused on the use of noncompetes for other low 
wage employees, including custodians and warehouse workers. See Matt O’Brien, Even Janitors Have 
Noncompetes Now. Nobody Is Safe., WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/2018/10/18/even-janitors-have-noncompetes-now-nobody-is-safe/?utm_term=.c202367855c7 
[https://perma.cc/4MXP-WGWY] (detailing a lawsuit between real estate firm Cushman & Wakefield 
and a former janitor); Spencer Woodman, Amazon Makes Even Temporary Warehouse Workers Sign 
18-Month Non-Competes, THE VERGE (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.theverge.com/2015/3/26/828
0309/amazon-warehouse-jobs-exclusive-noncompete-contracts [https://perma.cc/G2R6-T36Y] (out-
lining the highly restrictive noncompetes used for Amazon’s warehouse workers). 
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This Part sets forth the context necessary for assessing the im-
portance of the new Massachusetts legislation.26 Section A provides a 
thorough explanation of noncompetition agreements and their underlying 
philosophical motivations.27 Section B explains the history of the legal 
landscape of noncompete laws in the United States.28 Section C details 
the comparison between Route 128 in Massachusetts and Silicon Valley 
in California in the context of noncompetes.29 
A. Understanding Noncompete Laws and Their  
Philosophical Underpinnings 
A noncompetition agreement is a promise not to engage in certain types 
of business for a specified timeframe in a particular geography.30 These agree-
ments typically bar employees from doing work that competes with their em-
ployer’s business while they are employed and for some period of time after 
they have departed.31 The purpose of the noncompete is to restrict a former 
employee from later engaging in unfair competition by exploiting relationships 
or information obtained during the employment period.32 These agreements 
enable employers to protect much of their intellectual capital without running 
afoul of the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary servitude.33 
The legal requirements concerning the mechanics of noncompetition 
agreements vary considerably.34 Typically, noncompetes must be in writing; 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See infra notes 30–99 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 30–49 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 50–76 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 77–99 and accompanying text. 
 30 Covenant, supra note 1. 
 31 ALEXANDER I. POLTORAK & PAUL J. LERNER, ESSENTIALS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND STRATEGY 40 (2d ed. 2011). Courts tend not to have any reservations about 
enforcing noncompetition agreements during the employment relationship. Noncompetition Agree-
ment, supra note 1. Enforcement of noncompetition agreements for departed employees varies dra-
matically from state to state. DONALD J. ASPELUND & JOAN E. BECKNER, EMPLOYEE NONCOMPETI-
TION LAW § 1.1 (2018). 
 32 O’Gorman, supra note 11, at 177. 
 33 POLTORAK & LERNER, supra note 31, at 40; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slav-
ery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”); Pol-
lock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944) (explaining that the goal of the Thirteenth Amendment is to 
“maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United States”). Courts 
have long refused to order parties to carry out employment contracts. LOBEL, supra note 5, at 52. 
Such an order seems too close to slavery or involuntary servitude, so courts strongly prefer damages 
over specific performance as a remedy for breach of an employment contract. Id. 
 34 Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the Resource-Based Theory to Determine Cove-
nant Not to Compete Legitimacy, 87 IND. L.J. 979, 987 (2012). Dynamics such as bargaining power, 
enforcement standards in the state, and interests of the parties all impact individual agreements. Id. 
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beyond the writing requirement, execution differs based on the situation.35 
Noncompetes are often implemented early in the employment relationship, but 
this is not always a requirement.36 An employer might ask a worker to sign a 
noncompete after they have been employed for some time if, for example, 
management wants to share new confidential information or if they overlooked 
executing a noncompete when the employee was first hired.37 The terms of 
each noncompete, such as duration, geography, and prohibited activities, will 
vary based on the circumstances.38 
Noncompetition agreements exist at the intersection of contract law, tort 
law, property law, and employment law.39 They serve to provide additional 
protection for the property of companies beyond what can be achieved through 
the tort of misappropriation.40 Noncompetes can determine an employee’s abil-
ity to accept or decline employment; this notion of self-ownership has its roots 
in property law.41 From a contracts perspective, noncompetes are, of course, 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See Estlund, supra note 13, at 391 (giving background on noncompetes and the various ways 
they are used). A few states allow oral noncompete agreements, but the vast majority require such 
contracts to be written. Id. at 391 n.28. Washington state, for example, recently passed legislation 
designed to limit noncompetes that define a “noncompetition covenant” as a “written or oral cove-
nant, agreement, or contract” restricting an individual’s ability to work. WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 49.62.010 (West 2020) (emphasis added). 
 36 Estlund, supra note 13, at 391. 
 37 Bishara & Orozco, supra note 34, at 986. Similarly, a firm might ask an employee to sign a 
noncompete agreement right before that employee leaves the company for fear that the employee 
might take valuable information to a competitor. Id. 
 38 Id. at 987; see infra notes 50–76 and accompanying text (tracing the historical development of 
noncompete restrictions). 
 39 See POLTORAK & LERNER, supra note 31, at 40 (examining the connection between noncom-
pete law and intellectual property); Estlund, supra note 13, at 380 (highlighting the importance of 
contract law and employment law relative to noncompetes); Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psycho-
logical Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA 
L. REV. 519, 578 (2001) (explaining how noncompete law overlaps with ideas from contract law and 
tort law). 
 40 Estlund, supra note 13, at 416. An employer can protect trade secrets by suing for misappropri-
ation even without a noncompete, but such a claim requires proof of the misappropriation. See id. 
(describing the challenge of showing misappropriation). The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which has 
been adopted in some form by almost every state, allows for a misappropriation action where an indi-
vidual has improperly obtained or shared trade secrets of a business. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT 
(amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529 (2005); Michelle L. Evans, Establishing Liability for Misappropria-
tion of Trade Secrets, 91 AM. JUR. PROOF FACTS 3d § 6 (2020). Suing for a violation of a noncompete 
merely requires a showing of the breach of contract rather than proof of misappropriation. See 
Estlund, supra note 13, at 416. 
 41 Estlund, supra note 13, at 386. The U.S. Constitution, state constitutions, and common law all 
establish baseline standards around this concept of self-ownership. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. V 
(“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”); MASS. CONST. art. X (“Each 
individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and prop-
erty . . . no part of the property of any individual can, with justice, be taken from him, or applied to 
public uses, without his own consent, or that of the representative body of the people.”). 
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agreements; they are consensual in nature and made between parties able to act 
with free will.42 If an employee signs a contract with a covenant not to compete, 
this act suggests that he or she has consented to restrictions on post-employment 
activities.43 This freedom of contract is not without limits; noncompetes are sub-
ject to restrictions imposed by law in the interest of public policy.44 
The use of noncompetes generates tension between a company’s desire to 
protect its proprietary information and a departed employee’s need to find new 
employment.45 Many companies see covenants not to compete as crucial busi-
ness tools, whereas employees often consider them to be unfair.46 In theory, all 
companies might be better off if none of them had to rely on covenants not to 
compete; if every company knew that its competitors would not seek or use 
confidential information obtained from migrating employees, workers could 
move between firms more freely and companies would benefit from cost sav-
ings and increased idea flow.47 Unable to ensure collective good faith among 
employers, companies opt to restrict and silence their employees as a means of 
protecting their individual interests.48 As a result of this dynamic, employers 
have historically relied on noncompetition agreements.49 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Stone, supra note 39, at 578–79. 
 43 Id. Scholars offer a variety of contract theories for why a covenant not to compete should be 
enforced, including reliance and restitution, will, consent, bargain, efficiency, fairness, and synthesis 
theories. See O’Gorman, supra note 11, at 157 (detailing the dominant scholarly arguments for hold-
ing parties to their contracts). 
 44 Estlund, supra note 13, at 384–85. Employees are usually seen as having inferior bargaining 
power relative to employers and therefore in need of protection. O’Gorman, supra note 11, at 178. 
Employment contracts are often contracts of adhesion because in many circumstances prospective 
workers have little or no bargaining power. Id. 
 45 Joan T.A. Gabel & Nancy R. Mansfield, The Information Revolution and Its Impact on the 
Employment Relationship: An Analysis of the Cyberspace Workplace, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 301, 323 
(2003). This pressure has increased dramatically with the rapid progression of new technology. See id. 
(describing the Internet’s role in dissolving market boundaries). For example, the global nature of 
modern industry often renders geographic employment restrictions useless. Id. 
 46 Prescott et al., supra note 23, at 373. 
 47 See LOBEL, supra note 5, at 225–26 (discussing the link between economic theory and fights 
over talent). The employer’s decision to restrict movement of employees through noncompetition 
agreements exemplifies the economic phenomenon known as the prisoner’s dilemma. Id. According to 
the theory, firms would benefit from lower costs of hiring, the free flow of usable information, and the 
resources freed up by not having to pursue enforcement of noncompete agreements. Id. Companies 
have no way of ensuring that their competitors do not try to obtain protected information from depart-
ing employees, however, and the fact that such cooperation is impossible to guarantee means that 
firms are in a worse-than-ideal position. Id. 
 48 Amir & Lobel, supra note 11, at 864. 
 49 See Marx et al., supra note 11, at 876 (describing the existence of noncompetes in worker con-
tracts as “nearly universal” and detailing the history of these provisions). 
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B. A Brief History of Noncompetition Laws in the United States 
Under English common law, noncompetition agreements were unenforce-
able because public policy disfavored restraints on trade.50 The very first 
known case brought to enforce a restriction against one’s trade took place in 
1414, when a plaintiff sued to prevent one of his former clothes dyers from 
working locally for six months.51 Upon dismissing the case, the judge ex-
plained that such a restraint was contrary to the common law and famously 
chastised the plaintiff for bringing suit in the first place.52 This per se rule 
against restraints on trade held in English courts until the eighteenth century.53 
The modern approach to noncompetition agreements, which emphasizes 
the reasonableness of the restraint, emerged following the influential 1711 case 
of Mitchel v. Reynolds.54 In Mitchel, the Court of the Queen’s Bench declared 
that all constraints on trade were presumed to be invalid because of the damage 
they could cause to workers’ livelihoods and their net harm to society as a 
whole.55 That presumption could only be overcome if the restriction was limited 
in geographic scope and the limitation was reasonable; the court created a bal-
ancing test to weigh the social utility of the restriction against its private and 
public detriment.56 Through the 1800s, English and American judges frequently 
looked to Mitchel when deciding matters involving restrictions on employees.57 
                                                                                                                           
 50 LOBEL, supra note 5, at 52. Parties have fought over constraints in employment contracts since 
they first were implemented after the breakdown of England’s guild system in the eighteenth century. 
Norman D. Bishara et al., An Empirical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses and Other Restrictive 
Postemployment Covenants, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (2015). 
 51 Dyer’s Case, YB 2 Hen. 5, fol. 5, pl. 26 (1414) (Eng.); Marx et al., supra note 11, at 876. The 
case came about shortly after much of Europe’s labor force had been decimated by the Bubonic 
plague, perhaps contributing to the court’s distaste for restraints on labor in this instance. Marx et al., 
supra note 11, at 876. 
 52 O’Gorman, supra note 11, at 179 n.258 (citing Dyer’s Case, YB 2 Hen. 5, fol. 5, pl. 26). 
 53 Maureen B. Callahan, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A Reassessment, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 703, 708 (1985). 
 54 Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 637 (1960) 
(citing Mitchel v. Reynolds (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (QB)). The case involved a baker who leased his 
bakery and agreed not to act as a competitor in the region during the lease term, or in the alternative, 
to pay a bond if he did compete. Id. at 629. The defendant violated the agreement but refused to pay 
the bond. Id. Although this case involved a covenant not to compete relating to the sale of a business 
and not relating to a departing employee, the underlying principals were cited extensively in subse-
quent noncompete cases of either type. See id. (explaining the influence of Mitchel on noncompetition 
law). Professor Blake’s 1960 law review article synthesizing the origins of noncompetition agree-
ments remains widely regarded as a top authority on the history of noncompetes. Bishara et al., supra 
note 50, at 5 n.3. 
 55 24 Eng. Rep. at 351. 
 56 Id. at 350. The plaintiff was able to overcome the presumption that the noncompetition agree-
ment was void; the court ruled that the agreement and the consideration supporting it were reasonable. 
Id. at 352. 
 57 Blake, supra note 54, at 638–39. Mitchel was the most frequently cited case in the common law 
of noncompetition agreements for 250 years. Id. at 629. 
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This reasonableness test continued to develop during the next several cen-
turies of American jurisprudence.58 The first known case in the United States 
that dealt with a trade restraint, Pierce v. Fuller, decided in 1811, was—
fittingly—a Massachusetts lawsuit.59 In its opinion, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts began by noting that although restrictions on trade are 
generally disfavored because they harm the public by enabling monopolies, 
they may be enforceable if they are limited to a particular location for a partic-
ular time and supported by sufficient consideration.60 Other early American 
cases showed a similarly constricted interpretation of Mitchel, including two 
New York cases holding that trade restraints spanning the whole state were per 
se invalid.61 
Eventually, improvements in technology, the increased value of infor-
mation, and the diminishing importance of local borders began to put pressure 
on American courts to allow noncompetes more broadly.62 The United States 
Supreme Court endorsed enforcement of a noncompetition agreement in Ore-
gon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor in 1847, emphasizing in its opinion the 
shrinking commercial relevance of state barriers.63 These changes coincided 
                                                                                                                           
 58 See LOBEL, supra note 5, at 53–57 (detailing examples of courts evaluating noncompetes based 
on reasonableness); O’Gorman, supra note 11, at 180–84 (tracing the development of the reasonable-
ness standard through U.S. courts). In conducting analyses of reasonableness, American courts fo-
cused on shielding employees from unfair burdens. Blake, supra note 54, at 643–44. This contrasted 
with English law, which focused more on the terms of the contract. Id. 
 59 8 Mass. 223 (1811); Blake, supra note 54, at 626 n.3; see Charles E. Cantu & Jared Woodfill, 
Upon Leaving a Firm: Tell the Truth or Hide the Ball, 39 VILL. L. REV. 773, 780 n.30 (1994) (briefly 
summarizing the history of noncompete law in the United States). The case involved an agreement to 
refrain from running a stagecoach between Boston and Providence that the defendant allegedly 
breached. Pierce, 8 Mass. at 223. 
 60 Pierce, 8 Mass. at 226. The court ultimately upheld the agreement, finding there was no harm 
to the public and that the consideration of one dollar was adequate based on the circumstances. Id. at 
227–28. 
 61 Blake, supra note 54, at 644. In Lawrence v. Kidder, the court explained that contracts restrain-
ing trade through a whole state or country are “uniformly void,” while those restricting trade in only a 
town or district are “sometimes held valid.” 10 Barb. 641, 642 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851). Similarly, in 
Dunlop v. Gregory, the court noted that any contracts preventing an employee from the statewide 
practice of his craft are void. 10 N.Y. 241 (1851). 
 62 See LOBEL, supra note 5, at 53 (describing the recent societal changes that impacted noncom-
pete law). 
 63 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64, 67–68 (1873); Blake, supra note 54, at 644. The plaintiff in the lawsuit 
sought $75,000 in damages after selling its steamer to the defendant for that amount, subject to a 
promise that the buyer would not run the steamer on any competing routes in California waters. 
Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 65. The defendant breached the agreement. Id. In its analysis, the Court 
reasoned that the United States “is substantially one country, especially in all matters of trade and 
business” and found no public policy reason to invalidate the agreement. Id. at 67, 72. 
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with the evolution of employment-specific noncompete laws, which began to 
form their own subset of law, distinct from the wider restraints on trade.64 
By the end of the nineteenth century, reasonableness was the standard in 
the majority of states for determining whether a noncompetition agreement 
should be enforced.65 This was true not only for cases involving the sale of a 
business but also for cases looking at restraints on employees.66 The method-
ology that developed in Massachusetts was representative of such an ap-
proach.67 Massachusetts would enforce a noncompetition agreement, but only 
if a case-specific inquiry showed the restraint was needed for legitimate busi-
ness reasons, appropriate in its geographic and temporal limits, and in accord 
with the public interest.68 
Not all states chose to follow this formulation.69 California has long been 
the most notable state that refuses to enforce noncompetition agreements alto-
gether.70 California’s decision not to honor noncompetes was largely the prod-
uct of happenstance.71 When deciding on their substantive laws in the middle 
of the nineteenth century, California legislators looked to the East Coast, par-
ticularly New York, for guidance.72 It just so happened that this was during a 
period when the New York legislature, led by David Dudley Field, was seeking 
to simplify state laws.73 The resulting “Field Code” never became law in New 
                                                                                                                           
 64 Blake, supra note 54, at 639. While prior centuries featured many cases involving noncompeti-
tion agreements relating to sales of businesses, courts began hearing many employee restraint cases 
during this time. Id. 
 65 O’Gorman, supra note 11, at 182. The test in the First Restatement of Contracts, which was 
published in 1932, defined a reasonable restraint as one that was not greater than required to protect 
the employer, imposed no undue burden on the worker, and did not harm the public. RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 515 (AM. LAW INST. 1932). As a subset of employment law, noncompeti-
tion agreements are governed by state law. Bishara, supra note 4, at 756. 
 66 O’Gorman, supra note 11, at 181. The development of laws regarding covenants not to com-
pete in the United States paralleled that in England post-Mitchel. Id. at 181–82. 
 67 See Bishara, supra note 4, at 758 (explaining the typical application of the reasonableness test). 
 68 See id. at 757–58 (comparing Massachusetts and other states to the “extreme outliers” of Cali-
fornia and North Dakota, both of which refuse to enforce noncompetition agreements). The applicable 
North Dakota statute voids “[e]very contract by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful 
profession, trade, or business of any kind,” with limited exceptions. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 
(2019). 
 69 Bishara, supra note 4, at 757. 
 70 See Marx et al., supra note 11, at 876 (comparing California’s noncompete statute with English 
common law); Prescott et al., supra note 23, at 390 n.25 (characterizing California’s noncompete law 
as being “at one extreme”). California’s approach has drawn significant scrutiny due to the state’s 
economic relevance. Bishara, supra note 4, at 757. 
 71 Gilson, supra note 5, at 613. 
 72 Id. at 613–14. After California was admitted to the Union in 1850, state legislators sought to 
bring order to the disorganized and disjointed collection of laws of the California territory. Id. 
 73 Id. In 1847, David Dudley Field was appointed as one of three commissioners tasked with 
changing the laws of New York State, and he came to dominate the revision process. Id. Known for 
his work reforming and codifying the law, Field was among the most prominent attorneys of his time. 
HENRY M. FIELD, THE LIFE OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD vii (1898). 
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York, but it gained relevance in the West—where laws were much less set-
tled—and it was eventually adopted in California.74 The Field Code generally 
barred noncompetes, and even as other states moved toward a rule of reasona-
bleness, California’s noncompete laws remained essentially unchanged.75 This 
distinction between the approach of Massachusetts—more permissive toward 
noncompetes—and the more restrictive approach of California has since be-
come the subject of considerable scholarship.76 
C. Route 128 and Silicon Valley 
In 1999, Professor Ronald J. Gilson wrote a groundbreaking article that 
sought to explain the impact of a state’s noncompetition regime on its econom-
ic development.77 Gilson examined two particular regions—Route 128 in Mas-
sachusetts and Silicon Valley in California—as a compelling comparison of the 
impact of state noncompete laws on economic development.78 Both economies 
boasted considerable developing technology during the mid-1900s.79 In addi-
tion, both regions were built largely around prestigious universities.80 The re-
gions made for an interesting contrast because California had refused to en-
force employee noncompetition agreements dating back to the 1870s, while 
Massachusetts courts had a history of honoring those contracts.81 Outcomes in 
the two regions were dramatically different; Route 128’s growth largely stag-
nated, whereas Silicon Valley thrived.82 
                                                                                                                           
 74 Gilson, supra note 5, at 614–15. Field’s brother, Stephen Johnson Field, a member of the Cali-
fornia legislature and later Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, was highly influential in the 
decision to adopt the Code. Id. Stephen Johnson Field later became a U.S. Supreme Court justice. Id. 
 75 Id. at 619. The relevant provision, Section 833, voided all contracts restraining someone from 
exercising a lawful trade or business, except for in the sale of a business or the dissolution of a part-
nership. Id. at 616–17. 
 76 See id. at 578 (putting forth the theory that differences in noncompete regimes explain the dif-
ferent economic outcomes in Massachusetts and California); Samila & Sorenson, supra note 13, at 
426–27 (discussing California and Massachusetts to highlight state-level differences in noncompete 
enforcement). 
 77 See Gilson, supra note 5, at 577 (explaining the author’s thesis). 
 78 Id. at 578. Gilson relied in part on Professor AnnaLee Saxenian’s research into the history of 
the two regions. Id. The latter argued that differences in organizational structure and culture explained 
the divergent economic outcomes in the two regions. SAXENIAN, supra note 5, at 2–3. Gilson con-
tended that the reason for the opposite outcomes in the regions was instead the different rules around 
enforcement of noncompetition laws. Gilson, supra note 5, at 578. 
 79 SAXENIAN, supra note 5, at 1–2. Route 128 traced its economic viability to World War II and 
Cold War defense spending. Gilson, supra note 5, at 588. Silicon Valley became a technology hub 
through the development of Stanford’s engineering program after World War II. Id. at 588–89. 
 80 Gilson, supra note 5, at 588. The Route 128 area is close to Harvard and the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, while Silicon Valley is home to Stanford University. Id. 
 81 See id. at 579 (tracing the history of California’s prohibition on noncompetition agreements in 
employment contracts). 
 82 Id. at 575. 
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By Gilson’s account, the Route 128 region had a substantial head start 
over Silicon Valley, with approximately three times as many employees as in 
Silicon Valley in 1965.83 Over the next several decades, however, Silicon Val-
ley saw significant labor market and export increases while Route 128’s 
growth began to lag.84 By 1990, Silicon Valley was exporting over $11 billion 
in electronic products, far more than Route 128’s total of $4.6 billion.85 
According to Professor Gilson, these opposite fates are explained by the 
differences in the respective regions’ employment dynamics.86 Route 128 
companies followed the more typical development of many large, vertically-
integrated firms, meaning that workers tended to stay and progress within one 
company and knowledge was contained within that business.87 Conversely, the 
environment in Silicon Valley was characterized by worker mobility.88 Em-
ployees tended to move freely between companies and frequently founded 
their own ventures, something that was practically unheard of in the Route 128 
region at the time.89 This mobility of employees in Silicon Valley enabled sub-
stantial knowledge sharing within the region.90 
There is an inherent tension between employee mobility and the protec-
tion of intellectual property, and a region’s legal approach to noncompetition 
agreements plays an important role in determining the balance between these 
competing factors.91 In Massachusetts, courts generally enforced any noncom-
petition agreement that was reasonable in scope and time, protected a legiti-
mate business interest, and did not disserve public policy.92 The outcomes of 
                                                                                                                           
 83 Id. at 587. The workforces in the two regions were approximately the same size by 1975. 
SAXENIAN, supra note 5, at 2. 
 84 Gilson, supra note 5, at 587. By 1980, for example, the semiconductor labor force in Silicon 
Valley had grown to sixty-four thousand employees, while the equivalent labor force in Route 128 
had decreased to nineteen thousand employees. Id. at 587 n.36. Similarly, by 1995, Silicon Valley had 
a 22.6% share of U.S. venture capital investments, more than doubling the 9.9% share in the Boston 
area. Anil Gupta & Haiyan Wang, The Reason Silicon Valley Beat Out Boston for VC Dominance, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 15, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11/the-reason-silicon-valley-beat-out-boston-
for-vc-dominance [https://perma.cc/M5YB-MVTB]. 
 85 Gilson, supra note 5, at 587 n.37 (citing SAXENIAN, supra note 5, at 2). 
 86 Id. at 577. 
 87 Id. at 591–92. Because workers expected to stay and rise at the same firm, companies were 
incentivized to keep learning and innovation wholly internal. Id. 
 88 Id. As some technology firms inevitably failed, those failed businesses directly or indirectly 
resulted in the formation of new businesses, a process known as “flexible re-cycling.” Homa Bahrami 
& Stuart Evans, Flexible Re-cycling and High-Technology Entrepreneurship, 37 CAL. MGMT. REV. 
62, 63 (1995). In Silicon Valley, this process happened consistently and quickly. Id. 
 89 Gilson, supra note 5, at 591–92. This meant that companies had access to more sources of 
knowledge and were more receptive to influencing factors from outside the firm. Id. at 591. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Amir & Lobel, supra note 11, at 835–36. 
 92 See Shevrin, 175 N.E.2d at 375–76 (stating the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s (SJC) 
test for the enforceability of noncompete agreements). Shevrin involved a manager who was fired 
after embezzling money from his company. Id. at 375. As part of a restitution agreement, the former 
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those cases that were litigated suggested that noncompetes in the region would 
likely be enforced.93 Faced with knowledge that a noncompetition agreement 
would probably be upheld, an employee bound by such an agreement would 
likely plan his or her career accordingly.94 According to Gilson, while this did 
not impact the initial development of the Route 128 region, the lack of em-
ployee mobility—and as a result, the lack of knowledge sharing—ultimately 
stunted its long-term growth.95 
Conversely, California statutorily bans most noncompetition agreements 
outright.96 The history of case law within the state confirms that California’s 
courts will typically void such contract provisions.97 The result, by Gilson’s 
account, is an employment market in which employees know they are free to 
leave and often do just that.98 This has allowed for considerable knowledge 
                                                                                                                           
employee signed a noncompetition agreement barring him from working in twenty-eight states for 
three years. Id. The company sued after the former employee sought new employment with a competi-
tor. Id. In upholding the validity of the agreement, the SJC explained that “[i]t has been long settled in 
this Commonwealth” that a contract restricting competition is not inherently void and may be en-
forced as long as it is “reasonably limited in time and space, and is consonant with the public inter-
est.” Id. at 375–76. That inquiry depends on the specific facts of each case. Id. at 376. In more recent 
cases, the SJC has reiterated that “[c]ovenants not to compete are valid if they are reasonable in light 
of the facts in each case.” See Boulanger v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 815 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Mass. 2004) 
(upholding a noncompete signed as part of a franchise agreement). 
 93 Gilson, supra note 5, at 606. 
 94 Id. Because of their poor prospects in litigation, employees who are considering changing jobs 
bear the additional risk of paying a settlement in states where noncompete agreements are generally 
allowed. Id. 
 95 Id. Eventually, after the legal infrastructure took hold, cultures and systems developed to en-
sure that the lack of employee mobility was self-perpetuating. Id. The enforcement of noncompetes 
meant that firms with workers who were less inclined to leave became more vertically integrated and 
businesses were more reluctant to outsource work. See Orly Lobel, Aggressive Talent Wars Are Good 
for Cities, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 4, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/10/aggressive-talent-wars-are-good-
for-cities [https://perma.cc/R47A-LEYX] (explaining the impact of noncompetes on the “ethos” of the 
Boston-area technology industry). 
 96 Gilson, supra note 5, at 607. The California statute voids “every contract by which anyone is 
restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind,” subject to certain 
exceptions such as the sale of a business. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2020). 
 97 Gilson, supra note 5, at 608. The California courts show a sincere commitment to the state’s 
noncompete statute. See, e.g., Edwards, 189 P.3d at 291–92 (reiterating California’s strong public 
policy against noncompetes and rejecting a narrow exception suggested by the Ninth Circuit); Muggill 
v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 398 P.2d 147, 149 (Cal. 1965) (rejecting a post-employment work 
restriction as against public policy); Chamberlain v. Augustine, 156 P. 479, 480 (Cal. 1916) (declaring 
all noncompetes void if they fall outside of the enumerated statutory exceptions). There are limits, 
however: for example, in some circumstances, a court may enforce a noncompete against a California 
resident where the contract includes a non-California choice of law provision, it is appropriate to ap-
ply out-of-state law, and the employee was adequately represented by counsel when signing the non-
compete. See NuVasive, Inc. v. Patrick Miles, No. 2017-0720-SG, 2019 WL 4010814, at *2 (Del. Ch. 
Aug. 26, 2019) (referencing a statutory exception to California’s ban on noncompetes). 
 98 Gilson, supra note 5, at 608. One study suggested that, through the 1990s, employer-to-
employer mobility in Silicon Valley was 40% higher than the national average. Bruce Fallick et al., 
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sharing, which helped to bring long-term growth in the region beyond that 
which occurred during its initial phase of development.99 
II. CHANGING LANES: THE NEW MASSACHUSETTS  
NONCOMPETE LEGISLATION 
In October 2018, nearly two decades after Gilson’s influential account 
was published, new law changed the legal regime of noncompetition agree-
ments in Massachusetts.100 The legislation, titled the Massachusetts Noncom-
petition Agreement Act, represents a compromise that ended years of debate 
among lawmakers and included language not yet seen in American noncom-
pete laws.101 This Part provides an overview of the new legislation.102 
Under the statute, a noncompetition agreement must meet a series of min-
imum requirements in order to be enforceable in Massachusetts.103 All types of 
noncompetes in Massachusetts are now subject to certain broad restrictions, 
some of which were carried over from the state’s previous legal regime.104 
Noncompetition agreements must be consistent with public policy.105 Addi-
tionally, the statute requires that a noncompete be reasonable in geographic 
scope and reasonable with respect to the range of activities that are restrict-
ed.106 A covenant not to compete can be “no broader than necessary” to safe-
guard a “legitimate business interest” such as trade secrets, other confidential 
                                                                                                                           
Job-Hopping in Silicon Valley: Some Evidence Concerning the Microfoundations of a High-
Technology Cluster, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 472, 477 (2006). 
 99 Gilson, supra note 5, at 608. The lack of noncompete enforcement is less relevant to the initial 
performance of Silicon Valley, but highly relevant to its growth trajectory. See id. (explaining the 
impact of labor turnover over time). This idea helps to explain why Route 128 could be so far behind 
Silicon Valley despite the former’s head start. Id. 
 100 Bob Salsberg, ‘Garden’ Clause in New Law Requires Pay During Noncompete, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/34d7fc49684a4c80a16c7a20c1022533 [https://
perma.cc/6EGP-VY9S]. 
 101 Id. Legislation had stalled in previous years, but lawmakers were finally able to reach an 
agreement due largely to a compromise over the so-called garden leave provision, which requires 
payment to restricted employees in certain situations. Id. 
 102 See infra notes 103–123 and accompanying text. 
 103 Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 24L (2020). 
 104 Compare id. (requiring noncompetes to be reasonable in scope and geography), with Novelty 
Bias Binding Co. v. Shevrin, 175 N.E.2d 374, 375–76 (Mass. 1961) (holding that a noncompete may 
be enforced if it is reasonable in time and space). The minimum requirements for noncompetes are 
laid out in section (b), paragraphs (i) through (viii) of the statute. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, 
§ 24L(b). 
 105 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 24L(b)(viii). 
 106 Id. § 24L(b)(v)–(vi). The statute defines a presumptively reasonable geography as that in 
which the employee provided services or was materially present within the last two years of employ-
ment. Id. § 24L(b)(v). Similarly, the statute defines presumptively reasonable activities as those ser-
vices which the employee provided at any time during his or her final two years of employment. Id. 
§ 24L(b)(vi). 
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information, or goodwill.107 A noncompetition agreement is also now capped at 
one year in length, with limited exceptions.108 
Some of the statute’s requirements vary depending on the timing and the 
nature of the noncompete.109 Agreements executed before the start of a work-
er’s employment must be given to the worker either on the date of a formal 
offer or ten days before the employee begins work, whichever is earlier.110 
These agreements must be in writing and must be signed by both the employee 
and employer.111 They must also say explicitly that the employee can consult 
an attorney prior to signing the agreement.112 For noncompetition agreements 
executed after the employee has already started working, notice must be pro-
vided at least ten business days before an agreement is to go into effect.113 
These noncompetes also must be in writing, must be signed by both the em-
ployee and employer, and must say explicitly that the employee can consult an 
attorney prior to signing.114 
Under the Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act, certain types of 
employees may not be subject to noncompetition agreements at all.115 Cove-
nants not to compete are now unenforceable against any employee who quali-
fies as nonexempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act; they are also unen-
forceable against employees who have been laid off or terminated without 
cause.116 Employees aged eighteen or younger and full-time or part-time un-
dergraduate or graduate students in an internship or other short-term employ-
ment, whether paid or unpaid, also may not be bound by a noncompete.117 
                                                                                                                           
 107 Id. § 24L(b)(iii). An agreement is presumed necessary when the business interest cannot be 
sufficiently guarded through a nonsolicitation agreement, a nondisclosure agreement, or another type 
of restrictive covenant. Id. 
 108 Id. § 24L(b)(iv). If the employee has stolen property belonging to the employer or has other-
wise breached a fiduciary duty, the agreement can last up to two years. Id. 
 109 See id. § 24L(b)(i)–(ii). 
 110 Id. § 24L(b)(i). 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. § 24L(b)(ii). This rule applies only where the agreement does not relate to the employee’s 
separation from the company. Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. § 24L(c). 
 116 Id. § 24L(c)(i), (iii). The Fair Labor Standards Act is a federal labor law enacted as part of the 
New Deal. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2018). The Act defines exempt and nonexempt employees 
based on the type of work the employee performs, how much he or she is paid, and the manner in which 
he or she is paid. Id. § 213. Nonexempt employees are entitled to a federally mandated minimum wage 
and overtime pay. Id. §§ 206–207. In effect, the Massachusetts law bans the use of noncompetes for 
those hourly workers eligible to receive overtime. Aaron Nicodemus, Massachusetts Noncompetes Get 
One-Year Cap, Higher Tab, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 10, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-
labor-report/massachusetts-noncompetes-get-one-year-cap-higher-tab [https://perma.cc/2QGG-EFDY]. 
 117 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 24L(ii), (iv). If a noncompete is held unenforceable under this 
section of the law, the remainder of the employment contract is not rendered void. Id. In employment 
law, this practice is known as blue-penciling. THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 24, at 11. 
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For those employees who are eligible to consent to post-employment re-
strictions, such an agreement must be supported by “a garden leave clause or 
other mutually-agreed upon consideration” in order to be enforceable.118 The 
statute defines a garden leave clause as an agreement that provides for the em-
ployee to be paid, during the restricted period, at least fifty percent of their 
highest base salary during the last two years of his or her employment.119 The 
statute does not elaborate on what might constitute “other mutually-agreed up-
on consideration.”120 
These rules apply only to the types of contracts that the statute defines as 
noncompetition agreements.121 They do not govern several other types of re-
strictive covenants.122 Noncompetition agreements made in connection with 
the sale of a business, nonsolicitation agreements, and nondisclosure agree-
ments are among those types of agreements that do not fall within the purview 
of the Massachusetts law.123 
                                                                                                                           
 118 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 24L(b)(vii). The concept of garden leave is borrowed from em-
ployment law in the United Kingdom and has drawn increasing attention in the United States. Charles 
A. Sullivan, Tending the Garden: Restricting Competition Via “Garden Leave,” 37 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 293, 294 (2016). Under English law, employees on garden leave technically remain 
employed but are not assigned any work, giving those workers time to tend to their proverbial gar-
dens. Id. at 295. In early examples of garden leave in America, employers tended to formally termi-
nate the employment relationship with those on leave, achieving some cost savings by taking away 
fringe benefits. Id. at 304. To date, the greatest use of garden leave provisions has been among upper-
level roles in the financial sector, where employers view the arrangements as being worth the costs. 
Id. at 303. 
 119 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 24L(b)(vii). If an employee has breached a fiduciary duty or has 
stolen company property and the restricted period extends beyond one year, the employer does not 
have to make garden leave payments during the extended portion of the restricted period. Id. 
 120 See id. This omission may prove problematic, as even recently a federal court in Massachu-
setts has reiterated the state’s view that continued employment serves as adequate consideration for a 
noncompete. See American Well Corp. v. Obourn, No. 15-12265-LTS, 2015 WL 7737328, at *1 (D. 
Mass. Dec. 1, 2015) (“Decades ago, [the Massachusetts SJC] held that a noncompetition agreement 
signed during employment ‘was not void for lack of consideration’ because it ‘contained a promise by 
the plaintiff thereafter to employ the defendant and by the defendant to work for the plaintiff.’” (quot-
ing Sherman v. Pfefferkorn, 135 N.E. 568, 569 (1922))). 
 121 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 24L(a). The statute defines “noncompetition agreement” as “an 
agreement between an employer and an employee . . . under which the employee or expected employ-
ee agrees that he or she will not engage in certain specified activities competitive with his or her em-
ployer after the employment relationship has ended.” Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. A nonsolicitation agreement is a promise to refrain from attempting to lure other employ-
ees or customers away from a company for a specified period of time. Nonsolicitation Agreement, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). A nondisclosure agreement is a promise not to share any 
information about trade secrets, internal processes, or other proprietary matters. Nondisclosure 
Agreement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
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III. TWO-WAY TRAFFIC AHEAD: PERSPECTIVES IN  
THE NONCOMPETE DEBATE 
The Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act occupies a middle 
ground in the broader landscape of American noncompetition law.124 The Act 
falls somewhere in between giving broad deference toward noncompetition 
agreements and prohibiting such agreements outright.125 Section A of this Part 
discusses some of the arguments for operating at either end of this spectrum.126 
Section B examines the contentions for and against moving to Massachusetts’s 
new middle ground.127 Section C explores the questions that remain unanswered 
and the ambiguities that remain unresolved in light of this new legislation.128 
A. Criticism and Praise of Noncompete Enforcement 
At one end of the spectrum of noncompete enforcement is the California-
type approach of refusing to honor noncompetition agreements.129 Only a few 
states follow this approach, but the number of states seeking to undermine the 
use of employee noncompetes is on the rise.130 Proponents of this methodology 
cite a range of theories to explain why noncompetition agreements should be 
generally unenforceable.131 One argument against the enforcement of noncom-
petes is that they are damaging to the economy.132 According to some empiri-
cal and theoretical studies, honoring noncompetition agreements hinders mar-
ket performance.133 This is in part because constraining knowledge tends to 
suppress entrepreneurship and obstruct technological progress.134 In addition, 
there can be more subtle ramifications that result from noncompete enforce-
                                                                                                                           
 124 Salsberg, supra note 100. 
 125 Id. 
 126 See infra notes 129–153 and accompanying text. 
 127 See infra notes 154–171 and accompanying text. 
 128 See infra notes 172–185 and accompanying text. 
 129 Amir & Lobel, supra note 11, at 837. 
 130 Id. at 842. Colorado and Oregon are among those states that have also passed legislation se-
verely limiting the use of noncompetes. Id. 
 131 See Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ L. REV. 939, 984 (2012) 
(advocating for the elimination of employee noncompetes). 
 132 See Blake, supra note 54, at 650 (“Anything that impedes an employee’s freedom of access to 
a job in which his productivity (and wages) would be higher, involves a cost in terms of the econo-
my’s welfare.”). 
 133 See, e.g., Amir & Lobel, supra note 11, at 837 (hypothesizing that noncompetes may diminish 
worker performance and disincentive employees from working to improve their skills); Samila & 
Sorenson, supra note 13, at 436. 
 134 Samila & Sorenson, supra note 13, at 436. One empirical study looked at data from urban 
areas from 1993 to 2002 and concluded that regions with lower enforcement of noncompetes tend to 
have higher employment figures and more innovation. Id. at 429, 436. 
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ment, including decreased employee engagement due to workers’ perceptions 
that their opportunities are limited.135 
The argument against the enforcement of noncompetes has also been 
framed as one centered around workers’ rights.136 Under a workers’ rights the-
ory, the individual employee should own the product of his or her human capi-
tal; this notion runs counter to the concept of post-employment restrictions.137 
There may also be situations where an employee is unjustly fired from an at-
will position but unable to take a new job in the same field due to the existence 
of a noncompete.138 Ramifications with respect to workers’ rights can often be 
undetectable; it is impossible to know how many employees did not start a 
venture or did not move to a preferred job for fear of legal retribution.139 
Another contention for why noncompetition agreements should generally 
not be enforceable is the sheer logistical challenge that enforcement poses.140 
Because companies tend to operate in multiple states and employees frequently 
change geographies, differences in state noncompete laws can lead to choice-
of-law and conflict-of-laws issues.141 Scholars argue that a uniform system of 
non-enforcement would be the simplest way to eliminate these problems.142 
At the other extreme of the modern American noncompete landscape are 
those states that broadly tend to enforce noncompetition agreements.143 This 
                                                                                                                           
 135 Amir & Lobel, supra note 11, at 837. Scholars emphasize the behavioral ramifications of 
noncompete enforcement, concluding that employees who are aware of their reduced market opportu-
nities may be less motivated to perform or develop. Id. at 846. 
 136 Bishara & Orozco, supra note 34, at 991. 
 137 Id. A prospective employee tends to have significantly less bargaining power and sees the 
signing of a noncompete as a means to an end, so it is unlikely he or she will appreciate the conse-
quences of the act at the time it is done. Id. As economic conditions deteriorate, a jobseeker’s position 
and leverage worsen because he or she will likely overvalue a job opportunity and minimize the po-
tential harm of a noncompete. Id. 
 138 Stone, supra note 39, at 581–82. 
 139 LOBEL, supra note 5, at 72. Many entrepreneurs lament that individuals pass up networking or 
job opportunities for fear of the appearance of impropriety. Id. 
 140 Moffat, supra note 131, at 952. 
 141 Id. If the parties have not specified which state’s law should govern their noncompetition 
agreement and a dispute arises, the employer and employee will likely be incentivized to get the case 
into a state court that is more favorable to their respective side. Id. at 957. Even if the parties have 
agreed that a particular state’s law will govern, that state’s rules may contradict the norms and public 
policy goals of the state in which the case is heard. See id. at 958 (detailing the outcome of a federal 
case in Illinois). In Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to apply Delaware law to a noncompete dispute despite a 
choice of law provision in the contract. 24 F.3d 941, 948 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 142 See, e.g., Moffat, supra note 131, at 965. 
 143 Amir & Lobel, supra note 11, at 837. Florida law, for example, explicitly provides for the 
enforcement of reasonable noncompetes. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335(1) (West 2020) 
(“[E]nforcement of contracts that restrict or prohibit competition during or after the term of restrictive 
covenants, so long as such contracts are reasonable in time, area, and line of business, is not prohibit-
ed.”). Similarly, reasonable and voluntary noncompetes are enforceable in Louisiana, though there are 
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type of legal regime, to which Massachusetts belonged until its recent legisla-
tion, backs noncompete agreements with the court system, subject only to the 
requirement of reasonableness.144 Proponents of this approach cite their own 
list of economic benefits.145 The enforcement of noncompetes helps employers 
preserve their intellectual property and client relationships, allowing compa-
nies to freely develop these assets and reduce fear that employees will leave 
and take that important property with them.146 It also provides firms with an 
incentive to invest in human capital.147 
In addition to these economic explanations, proponents of noncompete 
enforcement also make a principle-based argument, citing freedom of contract 
as a reason to honor these agreements.148 A default assumption of contract law 
is that private parties are free to contract with one another and in this way can 
protect their own interests.149 Under this school of thought, a court nullifying 
an otherwise valid, consensual noncompetition agreement seems like an un-
warranted or even hostile act.150 Another justification for the enforcement of 
noncompetition agreements focuses on state sovereignty.151 Absent federal ac-
tivity in an area, each state should be able to determine what is best for its citi-
zens and legislate accordingly.152 Any system that mandated uniform non-
enforcement would compromise this important principle of federalism.153 
                                                                                                                           
specific carveouts, for example, restricting such agreements among car salespersons. See LA. STAT. 
ANN. § 23:921(A)(1), (I) (2019). 
 144 Bishara, supra note 4, at 758. 
 145 Blake, supra note 54, at 627. 
 146 Samila & Sorenson, supra note 13, at 425. If employers can be sure that their efforts will not 
be used against them, they will be incentivized to invest in training and development. Id. 
 147 Garmaise, supra note 4, at 376. An employer’s investments in human capital include training, 
revealing trade secrets, and allowing participation in certain projects. Id. at 382. One study focusing 
on employees at the executive level suggested that increased enforcement of noncompetes leads to 
greater firm investment in managers’ human capital because firms are more likely to retain employees 
and thus more likely to reap the benefits of those investments. See id. at 377–78, 414. The same 
heightened enforcement of noncompetes, however, disincentivizes managers from investing in their 
own development because, with less mobility, they are less likely to benefit from personal improve-
ment. See id. 
 148 See, e.g., Ken Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and the Un-American Labor Law, 
82 N.C. L. REV. 1705, 1743 (2004) (detailing American courts’ eventual acceptance of noncompetes 
due to an emphasis on freedom of contract principles). The freedom of individuals to engage in em-
ployment relationships relies on that person’s ability to choose to leave when the relationship is no 
longer beneficial. Id. at 1706–07. 
 149 Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 683, 686 (1980). It is a basic assumption of our legal framework that individuals are generally 
free to enter contracts to safeguard their own interests. Id. 
 150 See id. at 685. 
 151 See Polly J. Price, Full Faith and Credit and the Equity Conflict, 84 VA. L. REV. 747, 835–36 
(1998) (exploring the issue of enforcing out-of-state noncompetes). 
 152 See, e.g., Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 59 P.3d 231, 237 (Cal. 2002) (holding 
that California’s interest in protecting employees does not supersede sovereignty concerns between 
states). A medical device product specialist subject to a two-year covenant not to compete left his 
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B. Somewhere in Between: Perspectives on the Massachusetts 
Noncompetition Agreement Act 
The new Massachusetts legislation has drawn both praise and criticism 
from noncompete proponents and detractors alike.154 As years of failed pro-
posals indicate, substantial compromise was needed in order for the statute to 
be passed.155 The result is a legal framework that occupies a middle ground: 
Massachusetts now places significantly more restrictions on noncompetition 
agreements but remains far from banning them outright.156 
Those against enforcing noncompetes and in favor of following Califor-
nia’s example see the new legislation as a partial victory.157 Generally, the 
changes make it more difficult for employers to rely on noncompetes.158 By 
banning noncompetition agreements for employees who are nonexempt under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, many of whom are in low-wage positions, the 
                                                                                                                           
position at Medtronic in Minnesota and joined a competitor in California. Id. at 233. Although the 
Supreme Court of California acknowledged that such a noncompete would likely be void under Sec-
tion 16600, it reversed a temporary restraining order barring litigation in Minnesota due to concerns 
over state sovereignty. Id. at 237–38. 
 153 See Scott Hovanyetz, Note, Non-Compete Agreements and the Equity Conflict: Applying 
Baker v. General Motors Through the Lens of History, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 253, 270 (2008) (dis-
cussing sovereignty concerns in relation to noncompetes). 
 154 See Nicodemus, supra note 116 (citing preliminary feedback from various stakeholders). 
 155 Salsberg, supra note 100. The reform was a “decade-long effort” with prior rounds of unsuc-
cessful negotiations. Katie Lannan, Changes to Non-Compete Agreement Laws, Including ‘Garden 
Leave,’ Begin Monday, WCVB (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.wcvb.com/article/changes-to-non-
compete-agreement-laws-including-garden-leave-begin-monday/23461967 [https://perma.cc/QD3Z-
TUJC]. For example, in 2009, state legislators were debating multiple proposed bills aimed at non-
compete reform. Advances: Week of July 19, 2009, ST. HOUSE NEWS SERV. (July 17, 2009), https://
www.statehousenews.com/news/2009689 [https://perma.cc/XB4B-XYCM]. State representative Wil-
liam Brownsberger, with twenty-five co-sponsors, filed Bill H.R. 1794; state representative Lori Ehr-
lich, with seven co-sponsors, filed competing Bill H.R. 1799 one day later. Id. Representative 
Brownsberger’s proposal aimed to void all employment-related agreements that restricted or condi-
tioned an individual’s ability to work as an employee or independent contractor after the employment 
relationship has ended. An Act to Prohibit Restrictive Employment Covenants, H.R. 1794, 186th Gen. 
Court (Mass. 2009). Representative Ehrlich’s proposal sought to codify many restrictions relating to 
reasonableness, limit the term of noncompetes to a two-year maximum, and exempt employees who 
earned under $100,000 annually. An Act Relative to Non-Compete Agreements, H.R. 1799, 186th 
Gen. Court (Mass. 2009). Both proposed bills were referred to the committee on Labor and Workforce 
Development and informed the drafting of proposed bill H.R. 4607, which was drafted in April 2010 
but stalled shortly thereafter. See An Act Relative to Noncompetition Agreements, H.R. 4607, 186th 
Gen. Court (Mass. 2010); An Act Relative to Noncompetition Agreements, MASS. LEGISLATURE, 
https://malegislature.gov/Bills/186/H4607 [https://perma.cc/2KHV-MNZB] (listing the legislative 
history of the bill). 
 156 Nicodemus, supra note 116. 
 157 Callum Borchers, Mass. Businesses Grapple with Uncertainty as Partial Ban on Noncompetes 
Takes Effect, WBUR (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.wbur.org/bostonomix/2018/10/01/mass-businesses-
grapple-with-uncertainty-as-partial-ban-on-noncompetes-takes-effect [https://perma.cc/B7AW-4A28]. 
 158 Nicodemus, supra note 116 (noting the heightened restrictions on noncompetes in Massachu-
setts). 
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legislation also improves the situation for a vulnerable population.159 In addi-
tion, the garden leave provision—the first such provision adopted by a U.S. 
state—makes noncompete agreements more expensive for employers and thus 
represents an important success for those seeking to limit their use.160 
The new law may also have significant economic benefits that allow the 
Massachusetts economy to better compete with less restrictive markets such as 
that of California.161 Lower numbers of valid noncompetes could potentially 
lead to an increase in entrepreneurship and innovation as individuals and ideas 
move more freely between companies.162 Similarly, the new rules may result in 
an increase in venture-backed businesses as the market landscape among local 
companies opens up to more competition.163 There may also be other economic 
improvements, such as increases in wages.164 
For those who favor the enforcement of noncompetition agreements, the 
Massachusetts statute represents tolerable reform.165 Though many policymak-
ers sought to eliminate noncompetes altogether, employer advocacy groups 
were successful in maintaining the ability to use these agreements in some 
scenarios.166 Additionally, even though the concept of a garden leave clause 
has been introduced, the compromise of allowing “other mutually-agreed upon 
consideration” creates a possible loophole that could allow employers to obey 
the garden leave requirement at a much lower cost than fifty percent of the 
employee’s salary.167 
                                                                                                                           
 159 Borchers, supra note 157. With limited exceptions, an employee must earn less than $455 per 
week ($23,600 per year) to qualify as nonexempt. See Crowe v. ExamWorks, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 3d 
16, 27 (D. Mass. 2015) (explaining that an employee must earn at least $455 per week to be consid-
ered exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act). 
 160 See Nicodemus, supra note 116 (explaining the added expense of garden leave). Providing 
“other mutually agreed upon consideration” may be a way for employers to get around the garden 
leave clause, but it is likely to meet resistance from employees. Id. 
 161 Jon Chesto, A New Era for Noncompetes in Mass. Begins Oct. 1, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 24, 2018), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/talking-points/2018/09/24/new-era-begins-for-noncompetes-
mass/PtoVtctQwOlI0r6lofmKhK/story.html [https://perma.cc/Y2PD-85AJ]. 
 162 Peter Cohan, Wall & Main: New Noncompete Law Makes Massachusetts More Startup-
Friendly, TELEGRAM.COM (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.telegram.com/news/20180820/wall-amp-
main-new-noncompete-law-makes-massachusetts-more-startup-friendly [https://perma.cc/ZD2Y-
CNKX]. 
 163 Chesto, supra note 10. 
 164 McGovern, supra note 2. On average, hourly wages are approximately 4% lower in states that 
readily enforce noncompetes. Id. 
 165 Borchers, supra note 157. 
 166 Nicodemus, supra note 116. Among those organizations fighting to preserve the use of non-
competes was Associated Industries of Massachusetts, a trade group that represents over four thou-
sand employers in the state. Borchers, supra note 157. 
 167 Jena McGregor, Massachusetts Bill Would Require Employers to Pay Up When Enforcing 
Noncompetes—but There’s a Loophole, WASH. POST (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/business/2018/08/02/massachusetts-bill-would-require-employers-pay-up-when-enforcing-non-
competes-theres-loophole/?utm_term=.70e3b20eadcb [https://perma.cc/G999-JWHW]. 
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The legislation also leaves employers free to protect proprietary infor-
mation through alternative methods.168 Proponents of noncompetes point out 
that, under the new law, companies can rely on nondisclosure and nonsolicita-
tion agreements to accomplish much of what they did under noncompetition 
agreements.169 Nonsolicitation agreements are particularly helpful for ensuring 
that former employees do not bring customers with them to another company, 
while nondisclosure agreements are meant to prevent former employees from 
sharing confidential information.170 Employers might look to restructure exist-
ing employment contracts in order to restrict employees through these permis-
sible means.171 
C. Uncertainties and Ambiguities in the Massachusetts Statute 
Parties on both sides of the noncompete enforcement debate agree that the 
new Massachusetts statute presents ample ambiguity.172 The most notable un-
certainty is how “other mutually-agreed upon consideration,” which is not de-
fined under the terms of the garden leave clause, will ultimately be defined in 
the real world by employers and courts.173 If employers are able to rely on con-
sideration in its broadest sense, this clause has the potential to undermine the 
statute’s entire concept of garden leave because minimal compensation could 
qualify as mutually-agreed upon consideration.174 It is currently unclear how 
this will play out, but interpretation of this portion of the law will likely be left 
to the courts.175 
                                                                                                                           
 168 Nicodemus, supra note 116. 
 169 See id. (discussing how employers might attempt to circumvent new restrictions). 
 170 See Estlund, supra note 13, at 395. Nonsolicitation and nondisclosure agreements are seen as 
“less restrictive” ways of controlling employee knowledge of trade secrets and thus receive more 
favorable treatment from courts. Id. 
 171 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 24L(a) (2020) (listing the types of agreements that are ex-
cluded from Massachusetts’s new legislation). 
 172 See Borchers, supra note 157 (outlining questions from lawyers in reaction to the law). 
 173 Id. Companies utilizing this part of the statute have offered stock options, severance payouts, 
or higher salaries as consideration for garden leave clauses. Id. 
 174 Salsberg, supra note 100. In theory, an employer could pay a nominal amount of a few dollars 
and meet the broadest legal definition of consideration. Id. Consideration is defined as any bargained-
for act, forbearance, or return promise that motivates a person to partake in a legal act. Consideration, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The Second Restatement of Contracts imposes no re-
quirement that consideration be adequate, and courts do not typically inquire into the adequacy of the 
consideration except in situations that suggest fraud or duress. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 71 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). It is imperative, however, that consideration has been bargained 
for. Salsberg, supra note 100. Should an employer try to undermine the Massachusetts garden leave 
clause by providing minimal consideration, the company would run the risk of a court invalidating the 
contract for lack of consideration. McGregor, supra note 167. 
 175 See Nicodemus, supra note 116 (noting the unresolved nature of the garden leave require-
ment); Salsberg, supra note 100. 
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Confusion is also likely to arise as to whether an employee is terminated 
with cause.176 The statute offers no explanation of what “cause” might be.177 
An otherwise valid noncompete is unenforceable against an employee who is 
terminated without cause, so employers may seek to expand the definition of 
cause in their employment contracts.178 It remains to be seen whether the con-
tracting parties or the courts will be responsible for determining what does and 
does not constitute cause for termination.179 
In addition, there are ambiguities with respect to the relationship between 
parties.180 The statute specifically governs the relationship between an employ-
er and employee, but it is unclear whether the statute also covers hybrid situa-
tions where a worker is an employee but also a stakeholder in the business.181 
This issue comes up for shareholders who are employees, partners in a partner-
ship, and members of a limited liability company.182 
Furthermore, the law draws a hard line between employees who are ex-
empt and nonexempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act—barring the use of 
noncompetes for the latter—but it can be challenging to correctly classify an 
employee.183 An employer who sues to enforce a noncompetition agreement 
against a former nonexempt employee would likely be met with a countersuit 
alleging that the employee was misclassified.184 There are also concerns that 
the prohibition of noncompetes for all hourly employees, even highly skilled 
ones, may ultimately lead employers to stop investing in their workers; it 
makes little sense for an employer to spend money on worker training if those 
employees can take what they have learned directly to a competitor.185 
                                                                                                                           
 176 David S. Rubin, Thorny Questions, Issues Emerging as Noncompete Act Takes Hold, MASS. 
LAW. WKLY. (Oct. 25, 2018), https://masslawyersweekly.com/2018/10/25/thorny-questions-issues-
emerging-as-noncompete-act-takes-hold/ [https://perma.cc/AEY4-K4QB]. 
 177 Id. Terminating “for cause” refers to the “dismissal of a contract employee for a reason that 
the law or public policy has recognized as sufficient to warrant the employee’s removal.” Dismissal, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 178 Rubin, supra note 176. Some employment contracts include acts such as fraud, felony convic-
tion, embezzlement, violation of policy, or insubordination as cause for termination. Id. 
 179 Id. Massachusetts case law defines “cause” as “(1) a reasonable basis for employer dissatisfac-
tion with a new employee, entertained in good faith . . . or (2) grounds for discharge reasonably relat-
ed, in the employer’s honest judgment, to the needs of his business.” G&M Employment Serv., Inc. v. 
Commonwealth, 265 N.E.2d 476, 480 (Mass. 1970). 
 180 Rubin, supra note 176. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. Under standard tax rules, members of limited liability companies and partners are consid-
ered “self-employed” and are not categorized as employees. Frequently Asked Questions, IRS, https://
www.irs.gov/faqs/small-business-self-employed-other-business/entities/entities-1 [https://perma.cc/
8JAA-9KMM]. 
 183 Rubin, supra note 176. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Jack Garson, Surviving the Noncompete Challenge: How Businesses Can Effectively Cope 
with New Employment Laws, FORBES (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackgarson/
2018/10/16/survivor-the-noncompete-challenge/#fc8957ca24e5 [http://perma.cc/HC2B-CET5]. 
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IV. ARE WE THERE YET? BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF  
THE MASSACHUSETTS LAW 
The Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act represents a distinct 
inflection point in the state’s regulation of covenants not to compete.186 The 
state has gone from a classic example of a jurisdiction that upholds reasonable 
noncompetes to a pioneer in statutory methods for limiting them.187 Regardless 
of whether the legislation ultimately has a substantial impact on the state’s 
economy and labor force, the law has already attracted attention as part of the 
national reexamination of noncompetes.188 
This Part contends that the change in Massachusetts is a beneficial one, 
but that the legal infrastructure around Route 128 remains quite distinct from 
the framework surrounding Silicon Valley.189 It also argues that the ambition 
and omissions of the Massachusetts law should factor into the blueprints of 
states seeking to reform their own laws.190 Section A looks at the immediate 
impacts of the Massachusetts statute and revisits the comparison between 
Route 128 and Silicon Valley in the context of the new law.191 Section B argues 
that Massachusetts set a useful example for other states looking to reform their 
noncompete laws.192 
A. Route 128 and Silicon Valley Today 
Even without knowing how all aspects of the new statute will ultimately 
play out, the Massachusetts law seeks to make significant changes to the use of 
noncompetition agreements.193 It is likely that many of these objectives will be 
achieved.194 In particular, the law should be successful in reconfiguring which 
employees can and cannot be bound by a noncompete.195 
                                                                                                                           
 186 See Chesto, supra note 161 (characterizing the post-effectiveness period starting on October 1, 
2018 as a “new era”). 
 187 Compare Bishara, supra note 4, at 757 (characterizing Massachusetts, in 2011, as a typical 
example of a state where noncompetes are enforced), with Salsberg, supra note 100 (identifying Mas-
sachusetts as the first state to implement garden leave). 
 188 See McGregor, supra note 167 (discussing the national focus on Massachusetts’s legislation). 
 189 See infra notes 193–215 and accompanying text. 
 190 See infra notes 216–238 and accompanying text. 
 191 See infra notes 193–215 and accompanying text. 
 192 See infra notes 216–238 and accompanying text. 
 193 See Chesto, supra note 161 (urging businesses to pay attention to the changing employment 
law landscape). 
 194 See Nicodemus, supra note 116 (explaining that more extensive restrictions will take hold 
imminently). 
 195 See Borchers, supra note 157 (highlighting the clear rules redefining who can and cannot be 
bound by a noncompete). 
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The law takes its hardest line with respect to certain subsets of workers, 
banning outright the enforcement of noncompetes against these groups.196 
Covenants not to compete targeted towards low-wage hourly workers have 
recently drawn considerable public criticism and the Massachusetts law makes 
a strong effort to abolish them.197 Although the line between exempt and non-
exempt employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act may not always be per-
fectly clear, the Massachusetts legislature made this portion of the law easier to 
implement by relying on that existing framework.198 Employees should gener-
ally know—or easily be able to find out—whether or not they can be bound by 
a noncompetition agreement.199 Eliminating enforcement of covenants not to 
compete against interns and minors is likewise a sound method of undercutting 
employer overreach.200 
Another somewhat vulnerable subset of the workforce includes those em-
ployees who have been laid off or terminated without cause.201 Even with the 
potential difficulty of defining “cause,” barring the enforcement of noncom-
petes against these workers seems quite logical and long overdue.202 Employ-
ers should not be allowed to have their cake and eat it too, proverbially speak-
ing, by first laying off an employee and then preventing that employee from 
working elsewhere in the industry.203 This is a workers’ rights issue that the 
Massachusetts legislation purports to solve.204 
                                                                                                                           
 196 See Chesto, supra note 161 (commenting that noncompetes are banned for sandwich shop 
workers and other lower-paid hourly employees). 
 197 See id. (emphasizing the legislature’s focus on “entirely” eliminating noncompetes for low-
wage workers). 
 198 See 29 U.S.C. § 213 (2018) (detailing the FLSA’s exemption standards); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
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With respect to the other major changes, it is difficult to say whether they 
will have a measurable impact on employment dynamics in Massachusetts.205 
It is very possible, for example, that the seemingly innovative garden leave 
provision becomes merely decorative.206 For a variety of reasons, employers 
are likely to offer “other mutually-agreed upon consideration” as a substitute 
for garden leave; the apparent compromise of allowing such open language in 
the statute may be an indication that some legislators saw other aspects of the 
bill as being more important.207 If the garden leave provision is rendered a nul-
lity, the law may have a minimal impact on noncompetition agreements for 
those employees who remain eligible.208 
In spite of all these changes, it is important to note that the fundamental 
noncompete dynamic—that Massachusetts enforces noncompetition agree-
ments and California does not—remains intact.209 In that respect, Route 128 
continues to be quite far from Silicon Valley.210 A decade-long reform effort in 
which many sought to eliminate noncompetition agreements altogether ended 
with the permissibility of these agreements, at least in some forms, cemented 
into newly minted law. 211 
Massachusetts lawmakers have decided that the benefits of noncompeti-
tion agreements are worth maintaining, despite their often-cited drawbacks.212 
Those who hoped to replicate California’s general prohibition on noncompetes 
got a very different result.213 Indeed, much of the language in the Massachu-
setts Noncompetition Agreement Act tracks closely the historic reasonableness 
test developed in the state’s court system.214 The new statute, for example, still 
emphasizes that a noncompetition agreement must be in harmony with public 
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policy, must be reasonable in scope and geography, and must be no broader 
than necessary.215 
B. Massachusetts: A Model or a Warning? 
Several states are in the process of reevaluating laws that govern non-
competition agreements, and they can look to the acts of the Massachusetts 
legislature as they proceed.216 A crucial starting point is to decide where law-
makers want to be on the spectrum of noncompete enforcement: would the 
state benefit from a general prohibition on noncompetes, a Massachusetts-type 
middle ground, or broad enforcement?217 That decision will hinge on a variety 
of considerations, including a state’s main economic outputs, its socioeconom-
ic dynamics, the strength of certain lobbying groups, and the demands of the 
working population.218 
For states looking to reign in the use of noncompetition agreements but 
still allow them in some situations, the Massachusetts law provides a useful 
template.219 By relying on designations from the Fair Labor Standards Act, for 
example, the Massachusetts law offers a logistically accessible way to deter-
mine which workers should not be subjected to noncompetes.220 In addition, 
the law includes many safeguards designed to ensure that workers know what 
they are agreeing to when they sign a contract with a noncompetition clause.221 
States can also look to the shortcomings of the Massachusetts statute as a 
warning.222 In particular, the protracted debate in Massachusetts over inclusion 
of a garden leave clause suggests that this may be a contentious issue where 
compromise is difficult.223 Other states now have the opportunity to see if the 
provision is of any use in modifying employment relationships.224 If another 
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state ultimately decides to include a garden leave clause in its statute, the lan-
guage should be easier to interpret than that of the Massachusetts statute.225 If 
any such provision is to be included at all, it should not have the potential to be 
undermined by other aspects of the law.226 
An obscured but important issue with the Massachusetts law—that other 
states should consider—is the lack of any real enforcement mechanism for 
companies that deliberately run afoul of the rules.227 The Massachusetts statute 
only suggests situations in which noncompetition agreements will not be en-
forceable.228 It contains no method for sanctioning companies that, for exam-
ple, routinely include noncompetes in employment contracts in the hopes that a 
substantial portion of their employees are not aware of the law.229 Regardless 
of state enforcement practices, a covenant not to compete will achieve its goal 
if an employee believes that he or she is bound by it; this creates an incentive 
for employers to be overly aggressive with noncompetes and leave the burden 
of knowing the law on the employee.230 
Importantly, states reconsidering their noncompete laws now have the 
benefit of watching what occurs in Massachusetts in the immediate future.231 
Some of these states may ultimately chose to emulate California’s example and 
eschew noncompetes altogether.232 Although the opportunity for Route 128 to 
grow into Silicon Valley has long since passed, the decades of protracted de-
bate and the significant lobbying on either side of the dispute seem to suggest 
the political climate in Massachusetts never would have tolerated eschewing 
noncompetition agreements altogether.233 Indeed, a noncompete is an im-
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portant economic tool, and it seems counter to the notion of freedom of con-
tract to hold all such agreements as violative of public policy.234 
Those states looking to maintain the use of noncompetes in some form 
would be well served to follow Massachusetts’s example, which aims to carve 
out a middle ground that prevents abuses of noncompetes while maintaining 
their benefits.235 Massachusetts has taken a very important and positive step by 
explicitly banning noncompetes for certain types of workers—the most vulner-
able—including hourly wage earners, student interns, and those fired without 
cause.236 As a matter of fairness, workers who are not likely to possess trade 
secrets or who have unjustifiably lost their jobs should not see subsequent job 
searches hindered by the existence of a noncompete, and states considering 
new noncompete laws would be well served to use this principle as a founda-
tion for any proposed legislation.237 Whatever other states ultimately decide, 
the added data point of the new Massachusetts law and its subsequent imple-
mentation will allow this choice to be a better informed one.238 
CONCLUSION 
Noncompetition agreements have a storied history in the United States 
and the rules governing their enforcement vary significantly from state to state. 
Considerable scholarship has focused on this area; some of it has scrutinized 
Massachusetts, attributing slower growth in the region to the state’s deference 
towards noncompetition agreements. Seeking to change the employment land-
scape, Massachusetts lawmakers passed noncompete legislation in 2018. The 
new Massachusetts statute, a product of compromise, strives to strike a balance 
between the interests of parties on either side of the debate. Massachusetts 
modified its legal infrastructure but largely retained its historic system in 
which reasonable noncompetition agreements will be enforced. In this way, the 
state’s Route 128 business sector remains quite distinct from Silicon Valley in 
California, where noncompetition agreements are generally unenforceable 
when employees move between firms. It remains to be seen whether the modi-
fications in Massachusetts will help promote economic growth in the region 
and to what extent it may impact workers’ wages, turnover rates, and career 
trajectories. In the meantime, other states may look to Massachusetts as they 
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consider changing the laws surrounding enforcement of noncompetition 
agreements. Careful analysis of the ambitions and ambiguities of the Massa-
chusetts statute will better position these states to make their own modifica-
tions that best serve their local needs and employment dynamics. 
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